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This article explores the investigative methods used by cor-
porate security within organisations concerned about prop-
erty misappropriation by their own staff and/or others. The
research methods are qualitative: interviews, observations
and case studies carried out between October 2012 and
November 2015. The findings include that, even though
corporate investigators do not have the formal investigative
powers enjoyed by police and other public agencies, they do
have multiple methods of investigation at their disposal,
some of which are less used by public investigative agencies,
for example the in-depth investigation of internal systems.
Corporate investigators also rely heavily on interviews, the
investigation of documentation and financial administration
and the investigation of communication devices and open
sources. However, there are many additional sources of
information (for example, site visits or observations), which
might be available to corporate investigators. The influences
from people from different backgrounds, most notably (for-
ensic) accountants, (former) police officers, private investi-
gators and lawyers, together with the creativity that is nec-
essary (and possible) when working without formal investi-
gative powers, make corporate security a diverse field. It is
argued that these factors contribute to a differentiation
between public and private actors in the field of corporate
security.
Keywords: Corporate security, private investigations, private
troubles, public/private differentiation
1 Introduction
I remember from my time in the police that we were
always complaining that private investigators were
able to do anything and could just barge in some-
where. And now that I’m on the private end we as
private investigators complain that we can’t go in
because we don’t have the authority to do so. If
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someone doesn’t want to cooperate we can’t do much.
[Respondent 5]
Many concerns have been raised about the existence of a
private market for security; however, much less atten-
tion has been given to the actual activities of this field.1
As the quote above shows, a recurrent image of private
investigators is that they have much leeway and are not
bound by rules or moral considerations in their investi-
gations. Interestingly, private investigators, on the other
hand, often feel restricted because they do not have the
legal investigative powers law enforcement agencies are
endowed with. Our knowledge about the large (and
growing) involvement of private actors in the field of
security provision is still somewhat behind the curve
and merits more extensive scientific attention.2 One of
the relatively under-researched parts of the private
security industry is what will be called ‘corporate securi-
ty’ in this article. Although there is little recent work on
the corporate security industry in its entirety, earlier
work has been done on its specific parts.3 The article
aims to provide insight into private corporate investiga-
tions. This focus on the investigations instead of a spe-
cific kind of investigator (for example forensic account-
ants) makes for a more encompassing understanding of
the field. The commonalities between these various
investigators warrant such an approach, in spite of the
differences between them. The recent emergence of for-
ensic departments in law firms, and developments in
investigative methods (e.g. with regard to IT tools used
for investigations) furthermore indicate that the sector is
one in development, making it interesting to take a clos-
er look at the sector as a whole. A good understanding of
the activities of the sector will facilitate a solid discus-
sion on the positives and negatives of the corporate
investigations industry.
The article explores the corporate security industry by
focusing on private, corporate investigations into behav-
1. See, for example, the report of KRO Brandpunt, ‘Bespied door de baas’
(1 June 2014). Available at <http:// brandpunt. kro. nl/ seizoenen/ 2014/
afleveringen/ 01 -06 -2014>.
2. K. Walby and R. Lippert (eds.), Corporate Security in the 21st Century:
Theory and Practice in International Perspective (2014).
3. On the different parts of the industry, there is some interesting work
available. See, for example, J.W. Williams, ‘Reflections on the Private
versus Public Policing of Economic Crime’, 45 British Journal of Crimi-
nology 316 (2005). M. Gill and J. Hart, ‘Exploring Investigative Policing:
A Study of Private Detectives in Britain’, 37 British Journal of Criminol-
ogy 549 (1997). M. Nalla and M. Morash, ‘Assessing the Scope of Cor-
porate Security: Common Practices and Relationships with Other Busi-
ness Functions’, 15 Security Journal 7 (2002).
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iour by firms’ staff, management, subsidiaries and sub-
contractors that is considered problematic by these
firms. The greater part of ‘incidents’ occurring within
organisations never reaches the criminal justice system,
and it is important to take a closer look at the actions of
these corporate investigators.4 These incidents may con-
cern (alleged) criminal behaviour such as fraud, but they
may just as well be about behaviour that is considered
undesirable rather than criminal, for example conflicts
of interests. Although all kinds of unwanted behaviour
may be investigated by corporate investigators, most
incidents have an economic background (theft, fraud,
favouritism in the granting of contracts, etc.). Working
outside the formal investigative powers of public law
enforcement agencies, corporate investigators operate in
ways tailored to the problems that concern their clients.
The services provided by corporate security investiga-
tors include, for example, forensic accountancy, (pri-
vate) investigations more generally, IT services, asset
tracing, drafting and implementing integrity codes and
(assistance with) settlement and prevention tactics.5
‘Corporate security’ is a broad term that contains all
actors that are involved in the investigation of incidents
within organisations (consisting of economic loss, mis-
appropriation of assets, reputational issues and the like).
The field is quite diverse and includes private investiga-
tors, forensic accountants, in-house security depart-
ments and lawyers. Clients of corporate security may be
both commercial and (semi-)public organisations.
Respondents indicate that most of their clients are
medium- to large-scale companies, which they attribute
to the costs of investigations. In this article the term ‘cli-
ent’ is used to indicate the consumers of corporate
security services. In the case of an in-house corporate
security department, the client is for example the com-
pany’s management.
Some corporate investigative methods are broadly simi-
lar to those used in public policing (e.g. interviewing the
people involved or observing someone – although the
degree of duress, rights of the interviewee, etc. may dif-
fer), whereas other investigative methods are more pri-
vate in origin and in ‘ownership’ (e.g. forensic account-
ing methods or an audit of internal systems). Corporate
investigators have the same investigative powers as any
citizen, which means in practice that they can operate
with considerable flexibility.6 Depending on their pro-
fessional background, investigators may or may not need
a permit under Dutch law (the Wpbr). The Wpbr only
applies to private investigation firms, excluding in-
house departments (not working for a third party), for-
ensic accountants and lawyers (as they have their own
(but general) regulations). The Dutch regulation of cor-
4. N. Dorn and C. Meerts, ‘Corporate Security and Private Settlement: An
Informal Economy of Justice’, in J. Shapland and P. Ponsaers (eds.), The
Informal Economy and Connections with Organised Crime: The Impact
of National Social and Economic Policies (2009) 113.
5. Williams (2005), above n. 3; C. Meerts, ‘Corporate Security – Private
Justice? (Un)settling Employer-Employee Troubles’, 26 Security Journal
264 (2013).
6. Williams (2005), above n. 3.
porate investigations is thus rather scattered. The Priva-
cy code of conduct, obligatory to Wpbr- permit holders
seems to be followed by most respondents, though. In
addition, more general laws such as the criminal code
and privacy legislation (the WBP) apply to all investiga-
tors.
Many rights and possibilities of corporate investigators
are derived from the rights the client has as an employ-
er.7 In broad terms, employers are allowed to exercise
control over their employees; however, they should take
certain restrictions into account. In general, principles
such as legitimacy, subsidiarity, proportionality and the
right to privacy apply. When corporate investigators
investigate a case, they might gather a great deal of
information by talking to people (interviewing), by look-
ing into internal systems (e.g. personnel logs), firms’
communications (email, phone records), financial sys-
tems (accounting, sales and other systems) and open
sources (e.g. social networks) and by tracing assets. Cru-
cially, in terms of access and speed, there is no need for
them to wait for the approval of a prosecutor or judge
prior to the use of these methods – corporate investiga-
tors merely need approval by the client/management.
On the other hand, it is impossible for corporate investi-
gators to, for example, lay claim to financial records of
other firms, or to enter other premises – these being
powers granted exclusively to public law enforcement.
This may mean that it proves impossible for corporate
investigators to investigate an incident fully. Many cor-
porate investigators have a background in law enforce-
ment. One frequently mentioned reason for this career
switch is the perceived bureaucracy of the state appara-
tus and the expected freedom private investigators
enjoy. However, corporate private investigators, on their
part, feel that they are limited in their possibilities as
well, as they lack formal investigative powers. When
formal powers of investigation are necessary for a full
investigation, law enforcement agencies have to get
involved. Whether or not police and prosecution are
mobilised by a report to the police depends on the cli-
ent. This decision might be influenced by some advice
provided by corporate investigators, although some
investigators refrain from giving advice.
In this article the focus is on investigations into inci-
dents within organisations. How do corporate investiga-
tors conduct their investigations and what kind of meth-
ods of investigation and sources of information do they
have at their disposal? Clients rely on investigators to
provide them with the information they need to react to
the incident at hand – it is interesting to take a closer
look at the ways this information is gathered. In the arti-
cle the investigative process is considered, from the
moment an incident is reported to the investigators to
the moment investigators report their findings. The dis-
cussion reflects upon the material presented in this arti-
7. J.W. Williams, ‘The Private Eyes of Corporate Culture: The Forensic
Accounting and Corporate Investigation Industry and the Production of
Corporate Financial Security’, in K. Walby and R. Lippert (eds.), Corpo-
rate Security in the 21st Century: Theory and Practice in International
Perspective (2014) 56.
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cle, arguing that the field of corporate security is charac-
terised by a double differentiation – both externally
(from law enforcement) and internally (within the cor-
porate security field).
1.1 Methodology
This article is based on qualitative data gathered
between October 2012 and November 2015, as part of a
PhD research, funded by a NWO Research Talent
grant. An important source of information for the
research consists of fifty-four semi-structured inter-
views that have been conducted with corporate investi-
gators (thirty), clients (ten) and law enforcement profes-
sionals (fourteen).8 Respondents were approached
through snowball sampling and gatekeepers, making use
of previous contacts and previous research by the cur-
rent author. Snowball sampling has proven an effective
way to reach respondents in a ‘hidden’ setting.9
Although corporate investigators themselves are not
hidden, and indeed sometimes advertise their services,
there is no clear overview of how many corporate inves-
tigators there are in the Netherlands – partly because
only those who call themselves private investigation
firms officially require a permit. Clients highly value the
discretion applied by corporate investigators and as
such, many investigations remain private. Clients are
therefore difficult to reach without referral by a gate-
keeper. Because many investigations remain out of sight
of the criminal justice system, finding law enforcement
professionals with knowledge on the subject is equally
challenging without a gatekeeper. Referral by a trusted
gatekeeper furthermore has the added benefit that par-
ticipants tend to trust the interviewer more easily,
which may lead to more accurate data. To mitigate the
problem of selectivity, multiple gatekeepers and starting
points for snowballing have been used. At later stages of
the research, saturation of respondents occurred, which
is an indication that important respondents have been
reached. However, a snowball sample is inevitably a
purposive selection.
For each group of respondents a slightly modified topic
list was used, so as to take full advantage of the knowl-
edge of the respondent. Topics included regulation, pri-
vate investigation methods, private settlement decisions
and relationships between public and private investiga-
tors. Interviews had an average duration of one hour and
twelve minutes, with the shortest interview spanning
twenty-six minutes and the longest two hours and fif-
teen minutes. All interviews were conducted face-to-
8. The respondents are not equally divided among the three groups. The
reason for this lies partly in the fact that the research project is ongoing
and not all data had been gathered at the time of writing. In addition,
the choice was made to put emphasis on the investigators. Saturation
was achieved. Care was taken that the selection of respondents reflec-
ted the Dutch situation. For example, among the group investigators,
respondents were selected from private investigative firms, in-house
security departments, forensic accountancy departments and law firms.
9. M. Lamont and P. White, Report on Workshop on Interdisciplinary
Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research: Cultural Anthropology,
Law and Social Science, Political Science, and Sociology Programs
(2014).
face, and most interviews were with a single person,
although a few were conducted with two respondents at
a time. When possible, the interviews were recorded to
be transcribed verbatim at a later time. One respondent
did not consent to being tape-recorded,10 and on eight
occasions it was not practical to record the conversation;
in these cases extensive notes were taken.
In addition, two observations were conducted, one with
an independent corporate security firm (end of 2012,
seven weeks) and one with an in-house corporate securi-
ty department within a large Dutch firm (early 2015, six
weeks). The two different settings were chosen to see
whether the general picture of corporate investigations
would be similar in the different contexts. From these
observations, rich data has been derived. The observa-
tions were recorded in a daily observation report, based
on an observation schedule. During the observations
both informal conversations and interviews were con-
ducted.11 In addition, the observations provided twenty-
one case studies, which were separate case files from
investigations done by the observed investigators. Cases
were selected on the basis of criteria such as employee
involvement, sensitivity of the incident, the type of set-
tlement chosen and the involvement of law enforce-
ment. They were analysed using a topic list, describing,
among other things, the case, the (type of) client, the
investigative methods, the interests that were involved,
the settlements chosen and the role (if any) of law
enforcement. Not all information could be gathered
from the case files; however, additional questions to the
investigators often provided an answer here.
All data gathered is treated with utmost confidentiality
and has been anonymised to ensure that no information
can be traced back to the respondent or his or her
employer. The article should not be regarded as gener-
alising to the Netherlands as a whole; the statements
made are indicative of the respondents in the research
(who do suggest that their statements are more generally
applicable).
2 The Appeal of Private
Investigations
In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, private
parties do not have legally defined powers of investiga-
tion. This circumstance means corporate investigators
are restricted in their investigations as they are not
allowed to, for example, enter or search premises with-
out the consent of the owner. This type of far-reaching
investigative power is reserved for law enforcement and
safeguarded by legal norms.12 On the other hand, not
10. The reason given for this was that the respondent felt she could not
guarantee anonymity to her clients if the conversation was recorded.
The respondent seemed to talk freely once she was assured of anonym-
ity and that the conversation was only recorded through notes.
11. These formal interviews (four in observation 1 and seven in observation
2) are included in the total number of interviews mentioned above.
12. See the Dutch Criminal Code.
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being endowed with investigative powers also means
that the strict regulations and procedures a criminal
investigation has to follow are not applicable to a private
investigation. This gives the investigators considerable
leeway to act within their means as they see fit. Private
persons are allowed to investigate behaviour that is
harmful to them – or to ask other private persons to do
so – as long as they do not violate any laws. Legal per-
sons are considered private persons in this sense, and
when they act as client to corporate investigators, corpo-
rate investigators may use the investigative possibilities
of their client. As an employer, a company has the right
to control certain behaviours of its employees, and many
companies have made provisions in the labour contract
for the use of this information for investigative purpo-
ses.13 Corporate investigators thus often have access to a
lot of information.
Because of the large diversity of actors with different
backgrounds working in this field – ranging from for-
mer police officers to lawyers, IT specialists and foren-
sic accountants – there is a wide variety of skills and
expertise, going well beyond those of police investiga-
tions. These skills are applied to provide clients with
swift results that can be used to prevent future incidents
and, possibly, restore at least some of the damage done.
The different backgrounds of corporate investigators
also mean that different rules and regulations apply. As
mentioned above, specific legal regulations with regard
to private investigations are provided only for Wpbr-
permit holders (private investigation firms). For foren-
sic accountants and lawyers working as investigators,
there are the more general rules and disciplinary pro-
ceedings in place for their profession as a whole (addi-
tionally, in forensic accountancy there are principles of
law expressed in (non-binding) guidelines). In-house
investigators are governed by internal regulations. All
investigators have to adhere to the law on the protection
of personal data (WBP), and most respondents state
they apply themselves to the more stringent principles
of law applicable to accountants14 and the privacy code15
that has been written by the representative organisation
of private security firms (which has been approved by
the data protection authority). It would go beyond the
scope of this article to discuss these different rules and
regulations in depth, but where applicable, they are
mentioned. It should be noted, however, that most rules
regulating corporate investigators’ behaviour remain
very general. The Privacy code of conduct for Wpbr-
permit holders is the most specific set of rules; however
even these do not give guidance in every situation.16
13. C.D. Schaap, De private forensisch fraudedeskundige. Een feitelijke en
juridische positionering (2008).
14. NIVRA/NOvAA, NBA-handreiking 1122. Praktijkhandleiding persoons-
gerichte onderzoeken voor accountants-administratieconsulenten/re-
gisteraccountants (2010).
15. Nederlandse Veiligheidsbranche (NVB), Privacygedragscode sector par-
ticuliere onderzoeksbureaus van de Nederlandse Veiligheidsbranche
(2016).
16. Ibid.
The diversity in backgrounds and accompanying exper-
tise make the corporate security field of interest to pro-
spective clients. In his work on forensic accounting and
corporate investigations, James Williams has pointed
out certain advantages of corporate investigations from
the viewpoint of clients.17 The flexibility in investigative
methods and solutions; the orientation on private trou-
bles rather than criminal acts; and the possibility of dis-
cretion and control are important characteristics that
lead clients to prefer a corporate investigation over the
involvement of law enforcement agencies. This indicates
that distinctions between public and private remain rel-
evant in the field of corporate security even though inte-
grated networks of security seem to emerge in other
areas such as public spaces or shopping areas.18
The article takes a closer look at the types of investiga-
tive methods and sources of information which make it
possible to provide clients with the services and infor-
mation they need. While corporate investigators stress
their professionalism and neutrality, it is the client and
its interests that are leading. Investigations are directed
towards answering the questions that have been formu-
lated in the assignment by the client. Thus, the services
that are provided are tailor-made to meet the needs of
the client. For example, when investigating a suspicion
of fraud, corporate security investigators can be very
cautious in their investigations, so as not to create unrest
within the company. The interests of the client are pri-
oritised in the investigations and this may mean that the
investigations need to take a more subtle approach than
the police would take.
Ok so the police come in, take the administration. Do
you have any idea what that does to an organisation?
People go home sick, totally lost. And with us, things
go more quietly. They don’t even notice. They do
when we start interviewing and that will produce
unrest of course but that’s at the end of the investiga-
tions. What we do is more subtle, we do custom made
work. [Respondent 1]
Investigative firms and departments differ in their back-
grounds and structure, as reflected by the observations
conducted during this research. For example, there are
large and small investigations bureaus (or forensic
departments within accountancy or legal firms), and
there are large and small in-house departments within
large companies. Observation 1 was within an indepen-
dent corporate security company, with six employees at
the time of observation, of whom five were involved in
(all kinds of) investigative activities. Observation 2 was
within an in-house security department within a large
Dutch company, with fifteen employees at the time, of
whom eleven were involved in investigative activities. In
Observation 2, there was a division of labour, with one
team being responsible for the intake and registration of
cases, one team focusing primarily on desk research and
17. Williams (2005), above n. 3.
18. Williams (2014), above n. 7.
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one team (in the lead of the investigations) focusing on
interviewing.
3 The Ambit and Language of
Corporate Investigations
Depending on the position of the investigators, an
investigation usually starts with an intake of the assign-
ment (in the case of an external investigator) or the
report of an incident to the security department (in the
case of an in-house department).19 In both cases it is
customary that the ‘owner of the problem’ – be that the
manager of the suspected employee, the Board of Direc-
tors or someone else – and the investigators talk about
the reported incident in order to have a clear idea of the
scope of the problem. The extent to which this is possi-
ble at the start of an investigation may differ widely.
Respondents indicate that investigations may start with
a very clear suspicion towards one person or a pretty
straightforward problem, but it is also possible that the
question put to the investigators is very broad. It hap-
pens, for example, that the client is merely aware that
something is not quite right, but cannot put his finger
on the actual issue. This means that the assignment of
corporate investigators may be very specific or pretty
broad. Respondents state that the goal is to define the
assignment as strictly as possible before starting with the
investigations. This is especially relevant for investiga-
tions conducted by external firms (as distinct from in-
house or self-investigations) and in cases in which a cer-
tain individual is investigated (person-oriented investi-
gations).20 While this predetermined focus is helpful
and beneficial to involved persons in the sense of the
protection of their privacy, it also has the danger of the
investigations being pushed in a certain direction. ‘So
carefulness and clarity are important in your investiga-
tions, making sure you are not being used as the stick to
beat the dog and the individual is treated fairly’
[Respondent 27].
However narrow an investigation may be at the start,
during the investigative process the scope of the assign-
ment may, in consultation with the client, be broadened
or narrowed down. A broader scope usually means more
investigations and thus more expenses, which makes
deliberation with the client necessary. Respondents
from in-house investigative units indicate they have
more independence in determining the scope of the
investigations. According to respondents, the dialogue
with the ‘problem owner’ is especially relevant in the
first phase of the investigations.
[The level of contact with the client] depends on the
phase your investigations are in, the nature of the
issues involved. In the beginning of the investigations
19. Ibid.
20. As distinct from broader investigations into the organisation, not focus-
ing on an individual but an issue.
you’re going to have much more contact with the cli-
ent about things like, what kind of information are
you going to need, what’s available internally, which
information will need to be secured right away…
That’s contact on the operational level, with the IT-
department, the business line, the department that’s
responsible for the issue. And the question is for
example, will it be necessary to collect your informa-
tion quietly or do the employees already know there’s
going to be an investigation and is it ok for you to
contact the department and deliberate? How are we
going to secure the information, is it a lot, are we
going to gather everything, digitalise the information
and put it in a big computer so we can search effi-
ciently later on? Or is it limited in scale and maybe
already digitally present? Well, those are the kinds of
questions that are relevant at the start of your investi-
gations. [Respondent 13]
After the assignment is determined and the problem
defined, the investigations can commence. The methods
to be used depend on the case. The use of cameras may
be very helpful to see who has taken money from a cash
register, but it might prove useless in case of loss of
money through digital channels. In addition, the inter-
nal information and systems that are available partly
determine the path the investigations will take. Some
clients may have their own camera systems, track-and-
trace devices or other useful tools for investigations,
while others do not. In some cases, an employee suspec-
ted of wrongdoing is kept in place purposively so inves-
tigators might catch him or her in the act. In others, the
employee is suspended from active duty at an early stage
of the investigations so he or she may cause no further
harm. This also depends on the severity of the matter.
With someone who has an important position in the
organisation you don’t want to wait until you have
the results of the investigations before you act, he will
be suspended immediately. That person will there-
fore know about the investigations in advance. When
it’s about the disappearance of items from the work
floor or someone taking money from the till, you can
wait and see what happens if you for example would
mark a certain item [CM: to see who takes it].
There’s much less of a rush there and the critical risk
is less prominent. [Respondent 50]
In general, corporate investigators prefer a suspension
over an immediate dismissal of the involved person for
the duration of the investigations. ‘Sometimes the cir-
cumstances warrant immediate action. We prefer a sus-
pension [CM: over a dismissal]. So they are still held to
comply with your investigations because of their labour
relation with the client’ [Respondent 1].
The order in which the various methods are used may
differ. However, it is common to start with the investi-
gation of administration and the interviewing of wit-
nesses. The interview of the involved person(s) is usual-
ly reserved for the end of the investigations, so as to be
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able to confront the person with the evidence against
him or her. During the investigations, many corporate
investigators keep an investigative journal for internal
use. This journal records relevant actions taken by the
investigators, contacts they may have had with people
and other relevant information. Especially when there
are multiple investigators involved in a case, this may
prove very useful (however, respondents also indicate
that the thoroughness with which this journal is kept
differs among investigators). The journal can be regar-
ded as a log and may be used for the eventual report.
After the investigations have been concluded, a draft
report is made. Relevant parts of the report are then
usually handed to the involved person to read, in
accordance with the adversarial principle (see paragraph
6 of this article). After all involved persons have had the
opportunity to exercise their right of inspection, the
draft report is finalised and given to the client.21
As do most professional procedures, private investiga-
tions have their own language. In legal terms, the public
and private activities are separated by different termi-
nology. During my interviews and observations, most
respondents from the private sector referred to their
activities with different words than commonly used for
criminal justice investigations, and some made a point of
avoiding ‘law enforcement terminology’. Interestingly,
clients and law enforcement respondents seem to make
less of an issue of this. However, most respondents
avoid, for example, the word ‘suspect’, using the words
‘subject’ or ‘involved person’ instead.22 The same goes
for the information source of personal communication:
private investigators do not interrogate but they inter-
view.23 This difference in terminology also emphasises
the difference in investigative powers, as the power to
interrogate someone is exclusive to law enforcement
agencies. The Privacy code of conduct of the represen-
tative organisation of private security in the Netherlands
(NVB) states:24
This code of conduct abstains from the use of con-
cepts that are present in the criminal code to avoid
confusion with the detection of crimes by law
enforcement agencies. Private investigations do not
take place under the authority and responsibility of
the public prosecution office after all, and further-
more, its goals are different.
The differences in terminology seem to separate private
investigators and law enforcement on a symbolic level,
21. J. van Wijk, W. Huisman, T. Feuth & H.G. van de Bunt, Op deugdelijke
grondslag; een explorerende studie naar de private forensische accoun-
tancy (2002).
22. This article also avoids ‘criminal law terminology’, as the use of these
terms would be incorrect in this context. An involved person, for exam-
ple, is not a suspect in the sense of a criminal procedure (and as such
does not enjoy the same rights). The adversarial principle could be inter-
preted as being a criminal justice term (as it is a leading principle in
criminal proceedings); however, in the Dutch legal system, this is a term
that is used in all legal proceedings, from administrative to civil to crimi-
nal, and is thus not specifically linked to the criminal justice system.
23. See for example NVB, above n. 15.
24. Ibid.
something that respondents seem to confirm. As one of
the investigators in one of the observations said, ‘I’m no
private police’. Even though there are many corporate
investigators with a law enforcement background, and
their work may seem similar to the work of police and
prosecution, there are notable differences. In what fol-
lows, the principal components of a private corporate
investigation are discussed. First, the various sources of
information, leading up to the eventual confrontation in
the interview, are explored. Paragraph 5 discusses the
next step in the investigations, in which the involved
person is confronted with the information that has been
gathered. Finally, paragraph 6 examines the investiga-
tive report, which concludes the investigative process.
4 Gathering Information:
Investigative Methods
Leading up to Confrontation
4.1 Internal Documentation
An important source of information for corporate inves-
tigators is ‘the paperwork’. ‘It’s difficult to assess
whether the person is telling the truth and by starting
with the financials, you can get a sense of what might
have happened’ [Respondent 5]. When business is con-
ducted, actions are documented. This (digital or) paper
trail is a very valuable source of information in the
reconstruction of where the money went. Since the cli-
ent usually is the organisation where the irregularities
occurred, its records are generally available to the inves-
tigators. Because the client can order its employees to
cooperate fully with the investigations, relevant parts of
the organisation may deliver documented information
quickly. These documents include ‘anything that has
been written down’. ‘We usually start with the records.
And that is a very broad concept of course. There are
financial records, digital but also hard copy. Digital is
for example the books and hard copy the invoices,
source documents, everything that the books are based
on’ [Respondent 5].
The way these documents are constructed depends on
the type of services or products the client delivers, but
generally there are invoices, contracts, tenders and proj-
ect reports available. These source documents may pro-
vide an overview of what happened fairly quickly.
That provides you with a lot of information, transac-
tions are documented of course. There is someone
ordering, there is someone who approves it, there is
someone who enters it into the system.… Payments
are usually cashless, which means there are bank
records of them. So you try to gather all relevant
information, refine your knowledge and document it.
[Respondent 28]
Much can be derived from the financial administration
of an organisation. Sometimes this provides a straight-
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forward story and not much additional investigating is
necessary. Outgoing payments from the accounts of the
client often provide information on the person who
received the money. However, there are situations
where constructions are used to disguise the path the
money has taken and to hide the recipient. Information
provided by the client might not be enough to trace the
money or find out what happened. The access to docu-
mentation is limited to internal information from the
client, although involved persons may (and sometimes
do) provide access to their personal accounts. Some-
times this means that – because of the lack of investiga-
tive powers – corporate investigators will not be able to
pinpoint the problem. ‘There are situations where you
need the powers of investigation of the police. Especially
in these financial investigations. Sometimes you need a
warrant to get bank records. We can’t get to bank
records of third parties – that would be highly illegal’
[Respondent 1]. This problem of access makes it more
difficult for corporate investigators to investigate the
incident fully when, for example, subcontractors are
involved. ‘In the big investigation I told you about,
there was a subcontractor involved and he had his
administration, probably, at home. It wasn’t available at
our client company so we figured he kept it at home. We
asked him for it but he didn’t give it to us of course’
[Respondent 5].
4.2 Internal Systems
There are many different ‘internal systems’ an organisa-
tion may use. Generally speaking, all these internal sys-
tems may be put to use for an internal investigation, as
long as certain requirements are met (e.g. the employer
has to announce in general terms to his employees that
their movements may be tracked). Most of these sys-
tems are not meant for investigative purposes but can be
used anyway. What kind of system is available depends
largely on the (economic) activities of a client company.
For example, logistics companies often have track-and-
trace systems in their vehicles, and security cameras are
used more often in a large warehouse than on an office
floor.
4.2.1 Communications and Data Carriers
One category of internal systems revolves around
employees’ communications and use of data carriers.
Email-inboxes, mobile phones, PC’s, laptops and USB
sticks may be searched when they are owned by the
employer.25 This means that investigators are allowed to
investigate the use of company facilities. There are mul-
tiple, more and less intrusive ways to investigate com-
munications and data carriers. According to the widely
used principles of proportionality and subsidiarity,
investigative methods should be proportional to the goal
(and the interest of the client in reaching this goal) (pro-
portionality), and the least intrusive methods should be
used when possible (subsidiarity). For example, one
could use a phone tap to record a telephone conversa-
25. NVB, above n. 15.
tion, but one could also use mediation to track a phone.
Mediation and inspection of phone bills are less intru-
sive because while they show where the phone has been
and who has (been) called, the content of the conversa-
tion is not recorded. Often, mediation is a very useful
tool. For example, in one of the cases used for the case
studies, mediation was used to prove that an employee
was near the building where some equipment was stolen
on the day of the theft, even though he had called in sick
and was no longer working in the building.
When, for example, some property has gone missing it
might be helpful to also know what has been said in
phone conversations or by email. Phone calls cannot be
retrieved retrospectively, so a recording device has to be
present at the time of recording. Taking the principle of
subsidiarity into account, respondents state that they try
to avoid this type of information gathering as it is con-
sidered to be intrusive, even though privacy legislation
does allow it.26 When it comes to email, older informa-
tion could be retrieved. Email-boxes may be ‘imaged’
and stored in a database to search. This also goes for
‘the digital environment’ more generally. ‘In the larger
investigations, data recovery is a standard ingredient.
This may become pretty complex because you have to
take privacy regulations into account and when the data
crosses the national border, this may be a problem’
[Respondent 28]. Data carriers such as PC’s, laptops,
USB sticks and tablets can also be investigated with
regard to content or activity (e.g. internet logs), as long
as they are company property.27 The growing use of
BYODs (bring your own device, usually a laptop) may
in this light prove problematic for investigators, as the
investigation of these devices is not permitted. As men-
tioned before, private investigators lack the powers of
investigation law enforcement has, and therefore their
access is limited (though still quite extensive). Within
the boundaries of available information, corporate inves-
tigators may, however, investigate more effectively than
law enforcement would.
Of course they [law enforcement agencies] may
demand information and we will have to provide that.
But often they don’t quite know what kind of infor-
mation they need. For example they ask for the lap-
top of the involved person. But with that they don’t
have access to our system, just the computer. You
need authorised log in codes to access the system and
they don’t have that. I sometimes try to explain this
but unless you’re talking to someone from a special-
ised high tech team, they don’t know what you’re
talking about. They don’t understand how our sys-
tems work. Neither do I for some part but we have
people here who do. Generally they just look at the
laptop and stop there. There’s an entire world of
26. Ibid.
27. As long as they are accessible by the investigator. For example, when a
work laptop is used and stored at home, investigators may only access it
when the employee has handed it back to the employer. NVB, above n.
15.
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information behind that which they’ll never see.
[Respondent 43]
4.2.2 Other Internal Systems
In addition to the aforementioned communication sys-
tems, there are many other internal systems that may
provide information. Many companies, for example, use
a key card system for employees to gain access to a
building. These can be used to find out whether some-
one has been present at a certain site.28 Track-and-trace
or GPS systems are also used by some employers to
keep track of their deliveries or vehicles, and these may
provide information on someone’s whereabouts. In
addition, regular personnel files, such as a record of
someone’s work history at that employer, can be used as
background information. A more controversial internal
system is the blacklist. Although a blacklist meant for
internal use is allowed by privacy law, it is obligatory to
report sector-wide use of this beforehand to the data
protection authority.29 Many respondents indicate that
they are not sure whether their blacklist meets the crite-
ria, but they do keep a database with information on
people who have been investigated or fired in the past.30
These are often used as reference points in investiga-
tions (and in the process of hiring new staff). When an
organisation has an in-house security department, this
department often is the keeper of the blacklist. If not,
another department (such as human resources) manages
the list. In the latter case, investigators are not involved
in the management of the blacklist (as they are not part
of the organisation keeping the list). External investiga-
tive firms also keep their own records though, consisting
of the documentation of their investigations. These are
used as information for other investigations or back-
ground checks as well.31
Finally, the use of (hidden) cameras is not entirely free
from controversy. Cameras may provide valuable infor-
mation, for example when the footage can be used to
ascertain which employee took money from the cash
register. Although it is allowed to record employee’s
movements, privacy law prohibits the use of cameras in
certain places (such as the bathroom). Furthermore,
employees should be made aware of the possibility of
camera surveillance.32 ‘We have many cameras placed in
our buildings and people know this, they are made
aware of it. When we have a missing item at a certain
location, we can inspect the camera footage and look for
suspicious actions that are not part of the work process’
[Respondent 15]. Under certain circumstances, the use
of covert cameras is allowed.33 Respondents indicate
28. Although this circumstance alone is not sufficient proof, as people tend
to use each other’s key cards even when this is prohibited by the com-
pany code.
29. See Art. 22 under 2 sub b WBP; CBP, Een zwarte lijst gebruiken (2015).
30. This does not necessarily mean that the blacklist does not comply.
Many larger companies have a privacy officer who is better informed on
these issues than the respondents mentioned here.
31. NVB, above n. 15.
32. CBP, Cameratoezicht op de werkplek (2015).
33. NVB, above n. 15.
that the use of covert cameras is the exception rather
than the rule.
4.3 Open Sources
Much information can be derived from open sources. A
large proportion of both professional and social life
occurs online and for a person who knows where to
look, the internet contains a lot of interesting informa-
tion. In one of the observations, the investigations were
organised in such a way that some investigators focused
on doing ‘desk research’. This contains the investiga-
tions of internal systems as discussed above, but also the
investigation of open sources. One investigator was
highly skilled in this type of desk research and had sev-
eral (fictitious) accounts on social media sites so he had
easy access to this information. Social network sites such
as Facebook and LinkedIn may provide a broad over-
view of someone’s life (e.g. posts, photographs, likes,
sites followed) and professional network (which may be
useful, for example, to show that a third party that is
involved knows the involved employee).
In addition, there are some very valuable generally avail-
able or for-subscription databases. These might contain
information on Chamber of Commerce records, name
and address data and domain name registration. Many
investigators have a subscription to these databases.
Additionally, traditional media and the internet more
generally (and search engines more specifically) could
also provide a lot of valuable information to investiga-
tors.
4.4 Other Sources
Depending on the type of incident and the circumstan-
ces surrounding it, there are multiple additional meth-
ods of investigation. For example, observation can be
useful, although most of my respondents did very few
observations. Observing someone is allowed under pri-
vacy law, although not in every circumstance. In general
terms, an observation is less likely to be considered a
breach of privacy when it is done in a public place and
for a short period of time. More intrusive forms of
observation (such as dynamic observation using a track-
ing device) may be allowed, depending on the circum-
stances.34 Observations (and the use of camera footage)
are for example, used when an employee is suspected of
sick leave fraud. Site visits may also prove useful to see
whether the ‘reality on paper’ matches the ‘actual reali-
ty’. ‘For example, go and take stock for yourself and
make sure that what’s in the administration, is in fact
what’s in stock. To determine that, ok there is a possi-
bility that the warehouse keeper or someone else took
something’ [Respondent 13]. Some organisations fur-
thermore do a standard search of employees and their
belongings when they leave the workplace.
We also search people before they leave. We use a
metal detector for that as well. Sometimes this may
bring things to light. You know, situations where
people take something that isn’t theirs and that the
34. Ibid.
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alarm will ring. They’re asked to empty their pockets
and well, if something’s in there that doesn’t belong
to you, you’re going to have a good conversation with
me. [Respondent 15]
Other activities of corporate security investigators
include the evaluation (and correction) of previous
investigations, the evaluation of internal control sys-
tems, the calculation of damages in light of a civil claim
and the tracing of assets. When a report is made to the
police (which often happens only after the internal
investigations have been concluded), law enforcement
information may also be used to investigate further.
However, law enforcement agencies are very careful
with information sharing, as some investigators from the
observations noted:
That’s the thing. They think there’s no room but
there is. The shutters close on mention of informa-
tion sharing but that’s not necessary. When I report a
crime to the police, I would like to get some informa-
tion on their interrogations etc. They say, ‘no that’s
impossible because of privacy’. They’re so afraid to
get it wrong that the solution is not to share anything.
We don’t need operational details, it would be very
helpful if they could just give us directive informa-
tion without them having to have to start an entire
investigation. Just to let us know whether we’re on
the right track. [Conversation in observation 2]
5 The Interview: Confronting
the Involved Person
The interview is the most important source of informa-
tion for corporate investigators, according to respond-
ents. It usually is the last phase of the investigations, in
which all information that has been collected is used to
confront the involved person. Interviews with witnesses
often occur at an earlier stage as they are informative
(adding to the big picture). Many corporate investiga-
tors have a law enforcement background and are experi-
enced interviewers. However, there are notable differen-
ces between an interview and a police interrogation. For
example, there is no formal caution at the start of the
interview because the interviewee is not a suspect in the
sense of a criminal procedure. However, respondents
indicate that they do point out at the start of the inter-
view that the interviewee is not obliged to cooperate and
that he cooperates on a voluntary basis.35
His statement is made freely, I mean if during our
conversation he decides not to want to talk about it,
ok that’s his story. I’m not sure he’s going to be bet-
ter off with that but when someone walks out the
door, he walks. I’m not going to grab him by the neck
and say, ok now you’re going to talk. [Respondent 15]
35. Ibid.
The voluntary nature of the cooperation of an employee
should not be overstated. There is a definite power
imbalance between the employee and the investigators
(providing a service to the employer). Investigators
stress their independence within the assignment they
receive. ‘We have our own set of rules on how we con-
duct our investigations and we give this to our client at
the intake of the assignment. Sometimes they say, can’t
you do this and that. No, sorry. These are the rules, this
is how we do things’ [Respondent 2]. However, this
does not mitigate the power imbalance much. An
employee is technically free to refuse to cooperate – in
practice, he or she can feel forced to cooperate with the
investigations by his employer. Investigators are aware
of this ‘limited voluntariness’.
We caution people at the start of an interview, so to
speak, by saying they are not obliged to cooperate.
But they feel obliged of course. Sometimes someone
asks, what will happen if I don’t? Well then I will
have to talk to your manager about that. An interview
is very confrontational. I dare say we give high priori-
ty to fair play, we stick to our own procedures. But
we’re not treating someone with kid gloves. If some-
one has done something wrong, it’s ok to let him feel
that. We are about finding the truth, which can be in
someone’s advantage too. If you did nothing wrong
and we’re totally off track, here’s your chance to fix
that. [Respondent 44]
The Privacy code of conduct, binding to private investi-
gation firms and used by many other investigators as
well, pays attention to the question of undue pressure:
The mere questioning of someone by a private inves-
tigator produces a certain amount of pressure. As
interviews are done on a voluntary basis, as a rule
there will be no undue duress. It is hard to draw the
line between what is and what is not allowed. Keen
interrogation is in itself legitimate. It is thus allowed
to confront someone denying involvement with evi-
dence and to point out his weak position. Undue
pressure is exerted, however, when physical pressure
is used. Making false promises and verbal abuse are
also illegitimate.36
In addition to the legally defined rules, most corporate
investigators have their own guidelines for investiga-
tions and interviews. These include the right of repre-
sentation by a lawyer or union representative and the
general obligation for the investigators to treat the inter-
viewee with respect and refrain from applying undue
pressure and presenting false information.37 Moreover,
interviewees are given the opportunity to have a break
and are offered something to drink and eat. ‘As of late
we also include this in the interview report – that some-
one has been treated correctly, had something to drink
36. Ibid.
37. See for example GrantThornton, Grant Thornton Forensic & Investiga-
tion Services B.V. Reglement onderzoekswerkzaamheden (2010).
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and had to opportunity to use the bathroom. That’s also
to have proof of this for a possible court case of course’
[Respondent 45]. Because ‘the first thing a lawyer tries
to do, also in a police investigation, is to discredit the
statement that has been made by the involved person’
[Respondent 44].
Some respondents empathise with the interviewee, say-
ing that they can understand the position he or she is in
during an interview. However, most state, for example,
that
you need to be completely neutral in these things.
You didn’t contribute to this misery, you’re just
hired to get a clear picture of the mess and fix it. You
need to be professional about that. Of course, you
need to be friendly. When someone needs a break,
you offer him one and you record this in the inter-
view report. ‘At that and that time interviewee was
very emotional and we took a break’. So you also
report what time you continued, you give the man
some water, maybe suggest that he takes a walk in the
garden. And sometimes, I join them, have a smoke,
then some other kind of conversation unfolds. And
when he’s ready, you reopen the interview.
[Respondent 1]
Interviews are generally done by two interviewers.
There are multiple reasons for this, one of the most
important being the need to have a witness for what has
been said during the interview. Furthermore, having
two people present is beneficial to the expedition of the
interview.
One of us takes care of the conversation, the other
takes notes. So, we can make a report of the conversa-
tion on the spot and print it out and then the inter-
viewee can read it and sign. When there are correc-
tions that need to be made we will adapt the docu-
ment, print again and sign it. The interviewee signs
for having been made aware of the content of the
interview report and he gets his own print to take
with him. It happens that people don’t want to sign
because they do not agree or because they want to
talk with a lawyer. In that case, we sign it anyway.
And sometimes people don’t even want to talk to us.
[Respondent 44]
As the cooperation is voluntary, people may refuse their
assistance in an investigation. This could mean that he
or she does not want to talk to the investigators, or that
the interview takes place but the person will not answer
relevant questions. As the above quote shows, the inter-
viewee is asked to sign the interview report with the
interviewers, which he may refuse to do. In this case, a
note is made at the end of the interview report and in
the final report (see also below).
5.1 The Interview Process
Respondents explain that although an interview is often
done in a comparable manner, there are no specific stan-
dard ways to conduct an interview. Different interview-
ers have different styles. There is also a difference with
regard to the type of person who is interviewed (a wit-
ness or an involved person). Interviews with witnesses
are more informative than confrontational and often
happen at an earlier stage. (Self-imposed or formal
legal) rules regarding the interview with a witness are
less stringent than when it comes to an interview with
an involved person. It is required by privacy law that an
involved person is made aware of the investigations he is
subject to at the very beginning of investigations.38
However, there are some exceptions to this rule, for
example for the protection of the rights of others
(including the client).39 In practice, this means that
involved persons are often notified about the investiga-
tions at the moment of their interview, which often is at
the conclusion of the investigations. Although there are
situations ‘in which you need to talk to the involved per-
son as soon as possible, you often postpone this inter-
view until you know exactly which questions to ask,
based on the information you gathered’ [Respondent 2].
The situation is then also avoided in which the involved
person might destroy incriminating evidence.
In principle, you provide the involved person with
the code of conduct for investigations at the earliest
occasion, unless investigative interests are opposed to
this. So in case you have to start your investigations
and the involved person is still working there, there’s
a chance evidence will be lost. For example because
he erases all files from his computer or removes and
destroys physical documents from the administra-
tion. That would be a reason not to inform him just
yet. You will first have to secure the evidence and
only after that, when you know everything is safe,
you will notify him. [Respondent 2]
Interviews may take a very different turn from what
investigators had anticipated. It is therefore important
to stay flexible when conducting an interview.
Sometimes you decide on a certain tactic for an inter-
view but it turns out very differently. I remember a
case where we were expecting this person to be unco-
operative and so we decided to start with a confronta-
tion right off the bat. But we entered and he was very
open and he wanted to talk to us. You start with a
certain tactic but just like that it’s useless and then
you need to converse with someone in a different
manner than you’d expected. And it also depends on
the subject matter. Or for example when someone is
very emotional. Of course there are parts you can
prepare beforehand but when you discover during
the conversation that the important stuff is some-
where else you have to let go of your prepared list
and move to that subject. So you can devise a certain
grid but in practice it seems that you need to be very
flexible with that. [Respondent 5]
38. Arts. 33 and 34 WBP.
39. Art. 43 WBP.
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As this quote shows, however, interviewers do apply
certain tactics during an interview, and they prepare for
it.40 The level and depth of preparation depend in part
on the information that is already available. When the
interview is used as a close to the investigations, usually
there already is much information and ‘you can write
much down in advance, you can make a draft of the
interview report and confront him with it. Then you
add his reaction, his declaration’ [Respondent 44].
The two interviews that I was able to attend during the
observations had a certain structure. This structure is
also put forward by respondents.
There’s always a difference between interviewers, I
always say, you need to do your own thing. But the
standard elements are that you start with a social talk,
an explanation of the context of the interview, his
rights and sometimes his duties. So basically what’s
in our code of investigations. And usually, you move
from a general conversation to more specific ele-
ments. In this conversation you need to explain your
assignment also. So you use a funnel so to speak, as
an interview technique. The more specific questions
are somewhere in the middle of the conversation.
And then you start to show your evidence to the
interviewee. There’s a turning point in an interview
from informative to confrontational. That structure is
always there. [Respondent 1]
In general, the interviewers seem to build the interview
around three phases. The first of these is centred on
pleasantries – the interviewers start with light conversa-
tion to make the person feel at ease. This includes small
talk, for example about a person’s job. The voluntary
nature of the conversation is stressed in this phase. ‘I
want to tell you that you are here voluntarily, which
means that you don’t have to cooperate and when you
want to leave, you are free to do so. But of course we
hope you will cooperate with us’ [Observation 2].
After the interviewee has had the opportunity to talk
freely about what he thinks is the reason he is there, the
interviewers start with the second phase, ‘confronta-
tion’. Here the evidence that has been gathered through
other channels is used to confront the interviewee with
‘the holes in his story’. The ambience changes from
being amicable to more stern. Respondents state they
treat the interviewee with respect and do not apply
undue pressure. This was also the case during the inter-
views witnessed by me during the observations. The
40. There are many (mostly US) textbooks, e-learnings and other professio-
nal information available on different approaches and interview techni-
ques. In this paragraph the broader outlines of the interview as a source
of information are described – these very detailed instructions on how
to interview are beyond the scope of this article. Additionally, the field-
work reveals that many corporate investigators feel that interviewing
can be taught but much importance is given to experience and follow-
ing one’s own instincts. Although they state that there are no standard
ways to interview, stressing the importance of flexibility, they seem to
broadly follow the process as delineated in this paragraph. See also N.F.
Coburn, ‘Corporate Investigations’, 13 Journal of Financial Crime 2006
(348).
mere setting of the interview, however, could put pres-
sure on the person, even when no boundaries are being
crossed. Especially when the employee is without repre-
sentation, he might feel pressure to talk even though he
does not want to. The interviewers are experienced,
and, as mentioned earlier, respondents indicate that
interviews are done in couples, which brings a certain
force with it.
The final phase of the interview is the conclusion. At
this stage the important information that has been dis-
cussed is summarised and either typed up directly or the
interview notes are checked to make sure they are com-
plete. Most respondents prefer to finish the interview
report on the spot.
When it comes to an involved person, [drafting the
report at a later time] may not be the best course of
action because then you run the risk he will rethink
what he has said. ‘I said that but maybe it wasn’t wise
to do so, so I want it deleted’. When you correct the
report directly, print it, let him read it and comment
and ask him to sign, this risk is much smaller.
[Respondent 2]
The atmosphere seems to change back to amicable in
this last stage. The interviewers and interviewee might
discuss what will happen next and what the motivation
was for the transgression. If the report is typed up on
the spot, the interviewee – in accordance with the
adversarial principle – gets the opportunity to read it
and comment on factual errors. He is then asked to sign
the document, along with the interviewers. This is also
voluntary – the interviewee is not obliged to sign. ‘For
example, this involved person X refused to sign his
interview reports. We did sign, these were the state-
ments he made to two witnesses [interviewers]. So if it
comes to a trial, we can testify under oath about this’
[Respondent 1]. If the report is typed up at a later time,
the interview report is sent to the interviewee to com-
ment upon and sign. Respondents do not deem it prob-
lematic if the interviewee refuses to sign the document.
When this occurs, a note is made that the document has
been offered to the person to read and sign but that he
or she has refused to do so. Generally, this is considered
to provide enough information to make the interview
report usable.41
Interview reports differ in size, but they are often a
summary of what has been said instead of a verbatim
account. The interview reports available to me during
my research were mostly limited to a few pages. This is
not a good indicator of the duration of the actual inter-
view – only the relevant parts of the conversation are
summarised in the interview report. This means that the
interviewers have quite some freedom in drawing up the
interview report. However, the interviewee has the
opportunity to amend the report when he thinks impor-
tant parts are missing. The interviewee sometimes
wants to exclude certain information from the interview
41. Van Wijk et al., above n. 21.
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report, ‘for example private information that his manag-
er has no business knowing’ [Respondent 45]. It hap-
pens that investigators honour the request of the inter-
viewee, but only when the excluded information is not
relevant for the case.
And when someone wants to change something we
don’t agree with, we make a note of that and sign that
too. Openness, transparency, completeness. Pro and
contra. Those are important principles. It rarely hap-
pens that an interview report is reproduced in full in
the final investigations report but such a comment
will be mentioned in the report when relevant –
either to support or to defy your conclusions.
[Respondent 1].
The fieldwork reveals that using the methods of investi-
gation discussed, corporate investigators are often able
to provide a pretty complete reconstruction of the inci-
dent. Using phone records, combined with open sources
such as social media, investigators can map who has
been in contact with whom, where a third party lives,
works, etc. Furthermore, investigations into financial
records and other relevant documents can provide
insight into fraudulent financial transactions. When it
comes to theft from a shop, for example, cameras and
employee log files can be very useful. Although all
methods and sources of information described here are
valuable, respondents tend to place most importance on
the interview as a source of detailed information. Usual-
ly, the investigations lead up to the interview with the
involved person(s). In these interviews, information can
be checked, details added and errors corrected – that is,
when the interviewee decides to cooperate. All this
information needs to be made available to the client in a
concise and clear way. To achieve this, an investigative
report is written.
6 Reporting on the
Investigations
Once the investigations have been concluded and the
questions that were the basis for the assignment can be
answered, the information has to be made available to
the client. Reports are often quite short and to the point,
as respondents indicate that this format is best appreci-
ated by their clients. A report needs to be clear on the
facts and easy to read.42 Depending on the nature of the
assignment and the complexity of the incident, reports
may be merely 2 pages (not including appendices), while
others may span 150 pages. ‘The size of a report varies
between assignments but thirty pages is usually about
the length for us. Sometimes they are very factual, then
a lot of appendices might be attached, for example inter-
view reports’ [Respondent 36]. Some investigators pre-
42. L. van Almelo and P. Schimmel, Feiten maken het recht; Forensic
accounting revisited (2014).
fer to use appendices, while others prefer to integrate
relevant parts of interview reports or other findings in
the report without them being attached. ‘These inter-
view reports are for internal use, to build our case. They
are not an integral part of the eventual report. We do
use them to quote from, especially crucial parts’
[Respondent 5].
It is difficult to give a standard format of an investiga-
tive report, as there are notable differences in the way
the findings are presented. However, most investigative
reports contain the following subjects:43 ‘A report is
typically formatted like, what was the assignment, what
was the scope, what did we do and what did we find?’
[Respondent 36]. Some investigators also add some legal
information, a preface with some kind of disclaimer or
other relevant information. Opinions seem to differ with
regard to the necessary information for a report,
although there is some consensus that a report should be
transparent about the presented findings and how these
have come to the fore. The client needs to be able to
assess the validity of the report and interpret its find-
ings.44 Some commentators suggest that it is necessary
to have a predetermined goal for the investigations, for
example a report to the police or a dismissal.45 When
agreed upon between client and investigator, this prede-
termined goal is usually presented in the report. How-
ever, in practice the decision about what to do with the
results is often made only after the results are clear. ‘For
example, we hand in the report and the client says, “I
didn’t know it was this serious, I want to report to the
police after all”. Ok, so then we go and report to the
police’ [Respondent 1].
The standard of evidence in a civil procedure is lower
than that which is used in criminal court. ‘Improperly
obtained evidence is not as problematic for the proce-
dure in civil court. A civil judge will not readily dismiss
evidence, he might reprimand you for it but he has
heard it anyway and will use it. Plus, often it is not the
only evidence you have, you can build your case with
the other evidence as well’ [Respondent 50]. Cases may
also be concluded entirely without the involvement of a
judge,46 which makes the way evidence is gathered even
less of an issue in that sense. However, respondents
indicate that they feel it is important to ‘go by the book’,
both in a moral sense and because in many cases the
decision about how to handle the matter is made only
after the investigations have been concluded and the
report is handed in to the client. Some respondents
therefore state that they try to aim for the standard of
evidence that is used for criminal investigations. ‘You
43. There are some (very general) standards provided for forensic account-
ants, but not all corporate investigators use them. NIVRA/NOvAA,
above n. 14.
44. J.F. Rense, ‘De private onderzoeker; (ver)plicht tot hoor en weder-
hoor?’, 78 Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 76
(2004).
45. P. Schimmel, Fraudebeheersing; een leidraad van preventie tot detectie
(2011).
46. C. Meerts, ‘Over pragmatisme en strategie verschillende routes voor
private opsporing en afhandeling van onregelmatigheden binnen
organisaties’, 56 Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 115 (2014).
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have the highest standards for the burden of proof
there, beyond reasonable doubt. If it complies with that,
it will comply with the others as well. So this way, these
other settlement possibilities will all remain an option’
[Respondent 1].
Before the report is handed over to the client, the
involved person will usually get the opportunity to read
the relevant parts of the report and comment on it. This
implementation of the adversarial principle is derived
from accountancy rules; however, most respondents
state they comply with this rule even if they do not have
an accountancy background.47
And especially when it concerns an involved person –
you’re required to do so because it’s a person-orienta-
ted investigation – we use the adversarial principle.
The first phase of that is to invite him to answer
some questions. And the second is that when you
make a final draft of your report containing parts that
concern that person, you give him the opportunity to
react to it. So he can read it and comment on it. And
those comments are added to the final report…. And
I think this is a good thing and very reasonable. I
think that’s very important, it can’t be the case that
you just go about your investigations without ever
speaking with this person and still write a report
about him. Obviously, that’s not right. [Respondent
5]
Not every involved person takes the opportunity of
reading the relevant parts of the report. Respondents
indicate that this is not necessarily problematic, however
it does mean that caution should be applied when pre-
senting findings.
When the adversarial principle has been applied and the
draft is amended, the report can be finalised and signed.
Not every investigation yields enough information to
answer the questions asked in the assignment. When
this is the case, a report is made about the findings and
the lack of certainty is stated. Whether or not a conclu-
sion of findings is drawn in this final report depends on
the type of investigator. For example, forensic account-
ants consider drawing conclusions from the presented
facts or providing advice to their client in a report ‘not
done’.
We are hired for the fact finding, a forensic account-
ant does not assign value or interpret findings. At the
most, the report will state the rules that are applicable
and the behaviour that it concerns. The rule and the
behaviour will be presented side by side but it will
not be stated that the conduct was improper. Clients
always ask for a conclusion, ‘just write down what
you think’. But that would be subjective. The report
sticks to the facts. [Respondent 36]
Others prefer to give some advice on how to proceed but
the extent of this advice also differs among respondents.
47. Rense, above n. 44.
This respondent, for example, does include some advice
on the possible ways of settlement but provides no opin-
ion on the best solution in the current case:
Every case is different, the interests involved are dif-
ferent. Every time you’re faced with a different web,
different tensions. The outcome is different every
time. But you know, I don’t really care about that.
We have a job to do and do it well. You can provide
your client with the options but I’m not going to be
the one to say, this is the way to go. Who am I to say
they should report to the police? [Respondent 1]
Corporate investigators with a legal background are
more inclined to provide advice on how to proceed:
And eventually you will come to the point that you
write your report and explain your findings but also
draw conclusions based on that. That could be that
there must be measures taken against certain persons
or that the structure of the organisation should be
changed…. And it could also lead to the question
whether or not the incident should be reported to the
police. And that’s often a tough one to answer.
[Respondent 30]
The extent to which corporate investigators may influ-
ence decisions about settlement of the incident differs;
however, respondents indicate that the actual decision is
not taken by investigators. The client is the one who
decides. In in-house security departments, the division
between the investigators and the decision makers may
get blurry at times. ‘Whether or not it needs to be
reported to the police is a decision that does not concern
HR. They want to take the decision, but it will be me
who sees whether or not I find it useful. The policy is,
report every time, in practice it hardly ever happens.
I’m the one who has to go there and file the report so
I’m the one deciding’ [Respondent 48].
We do the investigations and that’s it. Two of my
colleagues have a different opinion, when they say
someone’s guilty he should be fired, another has a
more nuanced take on the matter. Our job is the
investigation, getting the evidence and building a case
that would hold up in court if necessary. The deci-
sions lie with the involved manager and HR. [Con-
versation in observation 2]
Interestingly, respondents working in an in-house cor-
porate security department indicate that not every
investigation merits a report.
We don’t always write a report, we get a lot of rub-
bish cases. In that case, it’s no use to write an entire
report. The rule is that when they want to fire some-
one, we do write a report for the involved business
unit, with an advice attached, for example about the
processes that made the transgression possible. But
when they are just going to give the involved person
an official warning, there will be no report. Maybe
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we’ll give some advice but nothing written down.
When there is no report, your notes, the journal and
our registration system ‘are the report’. [Respondent
43]
In such a case, the case notes are simultaneously the
final product of the investigations.
7 Discussion: Differentiation?
This article has explored the investigative methods that
are used by corporate security in its investigations into
incidents within organisations. Having to work without
the investigative powers of law enforcement agencies
might pose some problems for corporate investigators,
but it also provides possibilities. There are instances
when the information provided by the client and gath-
ered through the cooperation of various people proves
to be inadequate to reconstruct what happened. Corpo-
rate security cannot force people to cooperate48
(although a certain amount of duress might be present),
nor is it allowed to, for example, enter and search pri-
vate premises. This may mean that a report to the police
will be necessary if clients want to investigate the inci-
dent fully (which they may not).
Conversely, corporate security is more flexible than the
police are.49 It is responsive to clients’ needs, and
because of the close connection to the client and a con-
tractually created duty of confidentiality, much infor-
mation is readily available. Furthermore, because of this
and the absence of the need to wait for formal approval
from for example a judge, corporate investigations can
be executed and concluded fairly swiftly. The absence
of formal investigative powers may have sparked the
creativity of investigators to take a broader approach to
investigations and use methods of investigation that may
be regarded as more private in nature. The use of foren-
sic accounting techniques, IT tools and open sources
(for a large part digital social networks) does not fall in
the category of ‘traditional police work’ (although the
police are also increasingly making use of these techni-
ques and information sources).
This article has focused solely on the methods of inves-
tigation that private investigators have at their disposal.
As such, the methods of investigation that law enforce-
ment officials might use have not been discussed, and a
full-blown comparison between public and private is not
within the scope of this article. One important defining
characteristic of law enforcement, though, is its power
of investigation and the legitimate use of force.
Respondents who have previously worked in public law
enforcement indicate that they feel handicapped by not
being able to use formal powers of investigation. The
lack of investigative powers and the use of more specifi-
48. Neither can the police, of course, although they do have the power to
summon documents, enter buildings without consent (when this is
approved by a prosecutor or judge), etc.
49. Williams (2005), above n. 3.
cally private investigation methods mark a line of differ-
entiation between public and private actors in this field
(external differentiation). This seems to be underlined
by the avoidance of ‘criminal justice terminology’ by
corporate investigators.
In addition to the private investigation methods that
may be used by corporate investigators, another defin-
ing characteristic of the field is the diversity of people
working in it. Although there are many former police
officers working in corporate security, there are also
numerous ‘private actors’ active in the sector: forensic
accountants,50 private detectives51 and in-house security
departments (consisting also of people with a back-
ground specific to the sector of the company where they
work).52 In more recent years, lawyers have also estab-
lished a place in the private investigation industry.53
These different actors also bring their own expertise and
skills to the table. The internal differentiation within
this field may also be discerned in the different rules
and regulations that apply to the different actors. And
yet, although there certainly are differences between
these actors, there is also a large common ground
between them. Together, these actors – from varying
backgrounds, with specific occupational cultures, all
lacking formal investigative powers and yet all enjoying
a high degree of discretion and operational flexibility –
constitute the corporate security field in the Nether-
lands.
Thus, we might conclude that the field in which corpo-
rate security moves is characterised by differentiation.
First, externally, there is differentiation between private
actors and public authorities in relation to the methods
used, the power to use them and the rules one has to
comply with. Second, there is internal differentiation
within corporate security, according to professional
backgrounds. This article has focused upon the first of
these – the public/private differentiation – by taking a
closer look at corporate investigation methods. As Wil-
liams has previously noted, public and private actors are
not interchangeable here.54 Interestingly, corporate
security respondents seem to (symbolically) emphasise
this differentiation between them and law enforcement,
by avoiding the use of ‘law enforcement terminology’.
Private corporate investigators have created a formalised
professional private sphere, in which they use their
skills and expertise to provide clients with the services
they need. Previous research has remarked upon the
benefits for organisations of such a private solution over
a police investigation (and subsequently, a criminal tri-
50. Ibid.; J.W. Williams, ‘Private Legal Orders: Professional Markets and the
Commodification of Financial Governance’, 15 Social & Legal Studies
209 (2006); Williams (2014), above n. 7; Van Wijk et al., above n. 21.
51. Gill and Hart (1997), above n. 3; M. Gill and J. Hart, ‘Private Security:
Enforcing Corporate Security Policy Using Private Investigators’, 7 Euro-
pean Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 245 (1999).
52. Nalla and Morash, above n. 3.
53. B.C.G. Jennen and H.J.TH. Biemond, ‘Het interne fraudeonderzoek:
enkele juridische overwegingen’, 4 Tijdschrift voor de Ondernemings-
rechtpraktijk 57 (2009).
54. Williams (2005), above n. 3.
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al).55 Thus, differentiation rather than convergence
between public and private seems to be the key concept
in the field of corporate security.
One implication of this differentiation between public
and private and within the private sphere is the difficul-
ty with regard to oversight over the activities of corpo-
rate security. As mentioned, different actors have differ-
ent regulations to comply with, some more formal and
binding than others. The distance between public and
private and the large proportion of activities that stay
completely in the private sphere make it all the more
difficult to control the applications of these rules.
Although not as intrusive as the formal powers of inves-
tigation of law enforcement, corporate investigations
may have a large impact on the lives of the people
involved: a lot of information may be gathered about a
person, and the consequences (loss of employment,
repayment of damages, a criminal prosecution) may be
considerable. This research has not found indications of
illegal action by investigators – however the looseness
and diversity of rules and the lack of oversight make for
some potential for abuse.56 Even when all the (formal or
self-imposed) rules are followed, the impact of private
corporate investigations may be substantial, and there is
also the possibility of the abuse of the power imbalance
that exists between the organisation and the person(s)
under investigation. More research into the field of cor-
porate investigations and private settlements is therefore
warranted. One interesting line of research would be to
focus on the interaction between the rules on the one
hand and the behaviour of investigators in practice on
the other.
55. Ibid.; C. Meerts, ‘Corporate Security: Governing through Private and
Public Law’, in K. Walby and R. Lippert (eds.), Corporate Security in the
21st Century: Theory and Practice in International Perspective (2014)
97.
56. There are some disciplinary and civil cases about the behaviour of inves-
tigators. See, for example, ECLI:NL:TACKN:2016:49, ECLI:NL:CBB:
2016:148 and ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2015:5572. (Grave) misbehaviour of
investigators is not very readily assumed.
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